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he implementation in Malawi of a large-scale agri- 
cultural input subsidy program in the 2005/06 
agricultural season and  in  subsequent  years has 
attracted significant international interest. 1 While much of 
this attention has applauded reported growth in maize pro- 
duction and food security in the country, there have also 
been significant criticisms and questions. These have 
focused on the effectiveness and efficiency of the program 
in raising maize productivity, its impacts on the develop- 
ment of sustainable commercial input markets (Ricker- 
Gilbert,  Jayne, and  Chirwa  2011), its  high  and  (from 
2005/06 to 2008/09) dramatically rising fiscal and macro- 
economic costs, its opportunity costs (in terms of crowding 
out of other investments), its overall return on investment, 
and  its  sustainability  (SOAS et  al. 2008; Dorward  and 
Chirwa 2009a, 2009b, 2010; Dorward, Chirwa, and Slater 
2010a, 2010b; Kelly, Boughton, and Lenski 2010). 
The importance of agriculture—specifically, maize—to 
the Malawian economy and to the livelihoods of most 
Malawian people is the critical backdrop to the agricultural 
input subsidy program (AISP), together with low agricul- 
tural and maize productivity and associated high national, 
individual, and household food insecurity.2 Large numbers 
of very poor people in Malawi work on very small areas of 
 
land that are predominantly planted to maize (see table 17.1 
for some key indicators). Continual cultivation of maize on 
the same land without addition of organic or inorganic fer- 
tilizers leads to low yields. Low yields then lead to inability 
to  afford the purchase of inputs.  Purchase of inputs  on 
credit is also not possible for most farmers because rural 
credit markets are underdeveloped and the costs of credit 
administration are too high, as are risks for both borrowers 
and lenders. Low volumes of input  demand,  poor  infra- 
structure, and high transport costs lead to high input costs 
and inhibit the development of input supply systems in less 
accessible areas, while highly variable maize prices (dis- 
cussed below) add to the risks of input use (whether pur- 
chased with cash or credit). 
Increasing maize productivity is difficult for several rea- 
sons. Only 10 percent of Malawian maize producers are net 
sellers of maize, while 60 percent are net buyers of maize 
(SOAS et al. 2008), and hence most (particularly poorer) 
people’s livelihoods and food security are damaged by high 
maize prices. Increased maize productivity from the use of 
purchased inputs requires, however, that the use of the 
inputs is profitable for farmers, and that requires sufficiently 
high maize prices and yield responses to cover the costs of 
inputs. Unless substantial improvements  can be made in 
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Table 17.1 Key Data on Smallholder Agriculture  in Malawi, 2004/05 
 
Indicator North Center South National 
Rural population (percent of total population) 10 38 40 88 
Income and poverty 
Median expenditure/capita (MK thousands) 
 
17 
 
20.9 
 
16.9 
 
17.5 
Poor households (percent of rural population) 56 47 64 52 
Nutrition and food security 
Mean rural daily per capita consumption (kilocalories) for people living 
below the poverty line 1,738 1,811 1,703 1,746 
Incidence of stunting in children 6 months–5 years (percent) 39.6 47.9 40.8 43.7 
Incidence of underweight children 6 months–5 years (percent) 16.1 20 17.2 18.3 
Share of calories from own production 0.53 0.58 0.47 0.52 
Median month after 2004/05 harvest own food crop exhausted (actual)* — — — 4 
Suffered large rise in food prices in past 5 years (percent) — — — 79.2 
Smallholder agriculture 
Landholding: 
Less than 0.5 hectare/household  (percent  ) 12.1 15.4 25.4 19.9 
Less than 1.0 hectare/household  (percent  ) 31.4 40.6 54.1 46.2 
Suffered crop yield loss in past 5 years (percent) — — — 68.8 
Maize growers (percent) 93 97 99 97 
Access to credit for food crop inputs (percent ) 2.5 4.2 3.0 3.4 
Percentage of smallholder farmers purchasing fertilizer (percent) 37 44 39 43 
Fertilizer applied on all fields (kilograms)a  32 45 24 34 
Fertilizer applied on fertilized maize fields (kilograms/hectare) 139 111 77 101 
 
Source: SOAS et al. (2008) using data from NSO (2005) except * (authors’ calculations from NSO 2006). 
Note: — = not available. $1 = MK 140 for most of the years covered in this paper. 
a. Fertilizer rates on tobacco plots are roughly double rates across all plots. 
 
 
 
yield responses, there is a significant dilemma between the 
need for low maize prices for a large numbers of poor maize 
buyers (who are also significant maize producers) and the 
need for higher maize prices to allow increased returns from 
input use to reliably cover the purchase costs. Further diffi- 
culties arise from high maize price variability, which dam- 
ages both  producers  and  consumers—low prices present 
risks to investments in inputs by producers who aim to have 
a marketable surplus, while high prices present risks to con- 
sumers (including the majority of smallholder farmers). 
Poor access to international and domestic markets (caused 
in large part by historically low public investment in trans- 
port  infrastructure),  seasonal scarcities, and poor  local 
market development (resulting from low and uncertain vol- 
umes, high costs of transport,  and uncertain government 
intervention) have led in the past to high intra- and inter- 
seasonal maize price variation (as well as higher farm gate 
input prices and lower farm gate produce prices), further 
depressing market development. Risks of high maize prices 
encourage poor consumers to grow as much of their own 
staple food as possible, even at very low levels of productiv- 
ity. At the same time, there are limited higher-earning 
opportunities within or outside agriculture. The result is a 
lock-in to low-productivity maize cultivation. 
Productivity and investment in productive activities are 
further constrained by poverty and by vulnerability to a 
wide variety of (often related) shocks, particularly low crop 
yields, sickness affecting household  members, high food 
prices, and  losses of employment  or remittance  income. 
Women, who play a key role in agricultural production and 
rural livelihoods, tend to be particularly vulnerable to these 
shocks. Macroeconomic conditions before 2005—namely, 
high real interest rates, high inflation, and significant deval- 
uation of the kwacha (MK)—also inhibited growth. How- 
ever, macroeconomic management has improved dramati- 
cally since 2004. 
Agricultural, rural, and national economic development 
in Malawi are therefore constrained by a number of inter- 
acting household, local, and national vulnerability, poverty 
and productivity traps, as illustrated in figure 17.1. These 
traps constrain input and maize market development, 
investments in maize intensification, diversification out of 
maize into other agricultural and nonagricultural activities, 
the ability of rural people (particularly the poor) to protect 
themselves from shocks, and wider local and national eco- 
nomic development. The result is a vicious circle of unsta- 
ble maize prices inhibiting net producers’ investment in 
maize production,  net consumers’ reliance on the market 
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Figure 17.1 Vicious Circle of the Low Maize Productivity Trap 
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for maize purchases, and poor consumers’ escape from low- 
productivity maize cultivation. These in turn  inhibit  the 
growth of the nonfarm economy. Sustained improvements 
in maize productivity with low and stable prices are 
required  to  drive diversification out  of low productivity 
maize into a more diversified and productive economy that 
benefits all Malawians, particularly those who are currently 
poor and food insecure.3 
Input subsidy and maize market intervention policies 
have been a long-standing, major, though often contentious, 
feature of strategies of both the government of Malawi and 
varied donors’ to promote agriculture and food security. 
From the mid-1970s to  the early 1990s, the government 
financed a universal fertilizer subsidy, subsidized small- 
holder credit, and controlled maize prices. The system 
began to break down in the late 1980s and early 1990s, how- 
ever, with cash flow difficulties, rising treasury deficits, par- 
tial market liberalization and increasing importance of 
parallel grain markets. The state system of subsidized input 
loans, with loan recovery through farmers’ delivery of grain 
to the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corpora- 
tion (ADMARC), collapsed in the mid-1990s as a result of 
the coincidence of widespread harvest failure, multiparty 
elections, credit default, the rise of parallel grain markets, 
partial  implementation  of  liberalization  and  structural 
adjustment  policies, and  substantial devaluation (raising 
local fertilizer prices). With other policy changes drawing 
more productive smallholders away from surplus maize 
production and into tobacco production, there was a wide- 
spread perception in Malawi in the mid-1990s that falling 
fertilizer support was leading to diminished maize produc- 
tion and a food and political crisis. From 1998/99 the gov- 
ernment, with mixed donor support, reinstated a variety of 
interventions subsidizing maize fertilizer and seed access, 
with intermittent interventions in maize markets. Seed and 
fertilizer subsidies shifted from universal price subsidies to 
free provision of small “starter packs” initially provided to 
all households in 1998/99 and 1999/2000, and then to a 
more limited (but varying) number of targeted households 
in 2001/02 to 2004/05 (see, for example, Harrigan 2003). 
Analysis of smallholder agricultural performance since 
the late 1990s is complicated by difficulties with data and in 
separating out  the effects of poor  rainfall and  of policy 
changes responding to perceptions of an impending food 
crisis. In contrast to the widespread perception that maize 
production  fell during the 1990s and 2000s, official maize 
production  and overall food production  estimates show a 
strong rising trend through the 1990s to 2006, together with 
a modest rising trend during the same period in per capita 
food production  (including sometimes disputed estimates 
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of increasing cassava production). There were two years of 
very poor rainfall in 1991/92 and 1992/93, two years of good 
rainfall with universal distribution  of small free fertilizer 
packs in 1998/99 and 1999/2000, poor rainfall and lower 
fertilizer subsidies and production with widespread hunger 
in 2000/01, 2001/02, and 2004/05, and good rainfall and a 
large fertilizer subsidy in 2005/06. 
Fertilizer use also rose impressively through the 1990s, 
with an annual average of 6 percent growth in fertilizer use 
on all crops and commercial and smallholder farms between 
1984/85 and 2004/05 (SOAS et al. 2008). Starting in the 
mid-1990s, private input suppliers took over an increasing 
share of the fertilizer market from ADMARC and the Small- 
holder Farmers Fertiliser Revolving Fund (SFFRFM), both 
parastatals responsible for importing and distributing fertil- 
izers to smallholder farmers. By the end of the 1990s private 
input suppliers were responsible for more than 70 percent 
of national fertilizer imports and for a large proportion  of 
sales to smallholders (SOAS et al. 2008). During the 2002/03 
and 2003/04 crop seasons, 43 percent of smallholders sur- 
veyed in a nationally representative survey purchased some 
fertilizer (see table 17.1). Smallholders using fertilizer on 
maize applied an average of 101 kilograms per hectare (see 
table 17.1). Major parastatal involvement in fertilizer 
imports for subsidized fertilizer sales has, however, affected 
private sector sales and confidence in investment in imports 
and retail systems by varying, and debated, amounts. 
Widespread fertilizer use on maize produced by small- 
holder farmers is constrained by two problems: prof- 
itability and affordability. Unsubsidized fertilizer was not 
generally profitable on maize produced for sale in Malawi 
from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s.4 It was, however, 
more profitable on maize grown for households’ own con- 
sumption,  with a higher subjective valuation stemming 
from farmers’ fears of the effects of a bad year on maize 
purchase prices. For poorer farmers with this higher sub- 
jective valuation, however, affordability of fertilizer 
becomes a major problem. Liquidity presents substantial 
difficulties for poor farm households, who on the one hand 
face a “hungry gap” during  the  cropping  period  (when 
farmers need to invest labor, seed, and other inputs in crop 
production while food stocks from the previous season are 
running  low, and children are particularly susceptible to 
sickness) and on the other very high borrowing costs and 
an absence of low-cost financing services for inputs. Hun- 
gry-gap problems at the livelihood level are exacerbated by 
rural economy market effects (which depress wage rates 
and asset prices and raise food prices). These problems are 
widely recognized as very severe for poor rural households 
in Malawi, causing major production  and welfare prob- 
lems in rural areas.5 
Improving the profitability of fertilizer use in maize pro- 
duction requires lower fertilizer prices (as a result of greater 
efficiency in fertilizer supply and  reduction  in transport 
costs for importation or distribution of a subsidy, or both), 
higher maize prices, or greater efficiency in the use of fertil- 
izer (raising the grain output to nitrogen ratio).6 Changes to 
maize prices and improved efficiency of fertilizer use will 
not, however, improve the affordability of fertilizer for large 
numbers of poor rural households in Malawi. Making fer- 
tilizer more affordable requires very substantial reductions 
in fertilizer prices, the development of low-cost and accessi- 
ble financial services, or both. Development of such finan- 
cial services, however, requires that maize be profitable, that 
smallholders have other sources of cash income that can be 
used to repay fertilizer loans when the majority of the maize 
they produce is for home consumption, and that very low- 
cost systems be used for loan disbursement and recovery. All 
these requirements are difficult to achieve in Malawi. 
 
 
REVIEW OF INPUT SUBSIDIES 
 
To understand the implementation, impacts, strengths, and 
weaknesses of the Malawi Agricultural Input  Subsidy 
Program, it is helpful to examine broader historical and the- 
oretical lessons on input subsidies’ implementation, perfor- 
mance, and impacts.7 
 
 
Wider experience with agricultural input subsidies 
 
Large-scale (so-called universal) agricultural input subsidies 
were a common and prominent  feature of agricultural 
development policies in poor rural economies from the 
1960s to  the  1980s. They were subsequently criticized, 
however, as a major element in fiscally and economically 
unsustainable policies that were inefficient, ineffective, 
and  expensive in  Africa (see, for  example, World  Bank 
1981). These policies distorted market incentives, blunted 
competitiveness and farmer incentives, and undermined the 
growth of private sector agricultural services. While subsi- 
dized input systems may have seemed attractive to farmers 
(in regard to the services that were supposed to be pro- 
vided), theoretical difficulties with subsidy benefits (see 
below) were compounded by diversion and inefficiency, 
which often limited actual benefits to farmers. 
Evaluations of the rate of return  to alternative public 
investments in Asia tend to rank input subsidies as fourth or 
fifth, after investments in road infrastructure, agricultural 
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research and development, education, and often other types 
of public investments (see, for example, Fan, Thorat, and 
Rao 2004; Economist Intelligence Unit 2008). There are also 
arguments, however, that while returns to agricultural input 
subsidies were often low, they did yield substantial benefits 
in some countries at certain times. Such arguments stress 
the importance of differences between subsidies benefiting 
fertilizer suppliers and those benefiting (poorer)  farmers, 
falling returns over time where subsidies are effective, and 
the need for judicious (and changing) decisions on the scale 
of different investments, recognizing trade-offs, comple- 
mentarities, differences in the timing of returns, and poten- 
tial diminishing (and sometimes increasing) marginal 
returns  across different investments (see Dorward  et al. 
2004; Djurfeldt et al. 2005; Timmer 1989, for Indonesia; 
Fan, Gulati, and Thorat 2007, for India; and Dorward 2009). 
Information  on the performance of most of the recent 
input subsidy programs in Africa is limited despite the very 
substantial investments of public funds in these programs. 
However, recent empirical evidence from Malawi and 
Zambia shows that subsidies tend to be targeted dispropor- 
tionately to better-off farmers compared with poor and 
female-headed households, where affordability constraints 
are most severe (Govereh et al. 2006; SOAS et al. 2008); 
input subsidies have partially displaced commercial 
fertilizer demand, which has hindered policy objectives to 
promote sustainable development of commercial input dis- 
tribution systems (Xu et al. 2009; Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne, and 
Chirwa 2011); and the high costs of large-scale input subsi- 
dies means that there are very substantial opportunity costs 
in terms of forgone public investments, investments that, as 
shown by the Asian experience discussed earlier, may have 
greater long-term impacts on poverty reduction and agri- 
cultural growth. Moreover, Kenya has achieved impressive 
growth in fertilizer use on food crops based on strong com- 
mercial demand for inputs after the liberalization of input 
marketing and foreign exchange controls, without the use of 
subsidies (chapter  17; Ariga et al. 2008; Ariga and Jayne 
2009). The potential applicability of the Kenyan model, or 
parts of it, to other Sub-Saharan African countries needs to 
be considered, taking account of particular features of the 
Kenyan situation and experience. 
Dorward (2009), in a review of a number of input sub- 
sidy programs across Africa, also notes apparent tendencies 
for these programs to focus on production  objectives and 
producer  welfare (largely ignoring  potential  benefits for 
consumers and for wider pro-poor  economic growth); for 
poor integration of many programs with complementary 
investments; and in some programs, for an unfortunate lack 
of interest in improving effectiveness and efficiency. Two 
further commonalities are a limited focus on replenishing 
soil fertility and  a strong  prevalence of  heavy subsidies 
(50 percent to 100 percent subsidy rates) on rationed inputs 
(Dorward 2009). 
 
 
Theoretical benefits and costs of agricultural 
input subsidies 
 
Conventional arguments for subsidies in agricultural devel- 
opment have focused on the promotion  of increased 
agricultural productivity through the adoption of new tech- 
nologies (Ellis 1992). Reduced costs of subsidized inputs 
increase the profitability of these technologies and reduce 
the risks perceived by farmers in adopting them. Together 
with credit and extension services, input subsidies were sup- 
posed to help farmers implement, benefit from, and then, 
with the withdrawal of the subsidy, fully fund efficient input 
purchases and use themselves. 
Supply and demand  analysis of input  subsidies shows 
that because of deadweight losses, a subsidy can generate a 
positive net economic return to a country only if it 
addresses some market failure (Siamwalla and Valdes 1986). 
This may occur when: 
 
    farmers’ private costs of working capital for input pur- 
chase are greater than the social cost of capital, 
    farmers’ lack of knowledge about the benefits of inputs 
means that their expectation of the production  bene- 
fits from input use are less than the benefits they will 
gain, 
    there are learning costs with input use, meaning that ini- 
tial farmer returns are low but will increase with experi- 
ence (Ellis 1992; Crawford, Jayne, and Kelly 2006; Morris 
et al. 2007), and 
    farmers’ risk assessment and aversion to investing work- 
ing capital in input purchase and use are higher than 
society’s risk assessment and aversion. 
 
The size of the deadweight loss and the distribution of 
benefits between consumers and producers also depend on 
the elasticity of supply and  demand.  Demand  or supply 
inelasticity tends to be associated with smaller deadweight 
losses. Inelastic demand is associated with larger shares of 
consumer surplus benefits, while inelastic supply is associ- 
ated  with  larger  shares  of  producer  benefits  (Dorward 
2009). Staple food markets in landlocked countries tend to 
be associated with more  inelastic demand  by poor  con- 
sumers (where prices lie between export and import parity 
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prices). Demand tends to be more elastic for cash crops, 
particularly for cash crops that are exported.8 
Subsidy inefficiencies also arise when part of the cost of 
the subsidy goes to reducing the cost of production for pro- 
duce that would be produced anyway; when subsidies bid 
up demand and prices for land, labor, or inputs, and are 
passed back to suppliers of these inputs,9  and when 
rationing leads to opportunities for those controlling subsi- 
dized inputs to demand payments for provision of subsi- 
dized inputs. Another major concern with input subsides is 
the extent of leakage and diversion away from their 
intended use as a result of diversion between products, 
diversion from intended beneficiaries to others within the 
country, and cross-border leakage. 
A final, crucial point is that the technical efficiency of 
input use in generating additional agricultural production 
is critical in determining deadweight losses, distribution of 
benefits between producers and consumers, and wider eco- 
nomic gains. This efficiency depends upon the quality and 
appropriateness of the inputs  to the product  on which 
they are used, the timing of the delivery of inputs to farm- 
ers, the availability of complementary resources (for example, 
seed and fertilizer together), agro-ecological conditions, and 
farmers’ technical skill or competence in using the inputs. 
This analysis suggests that  large-scale input  subsidies 
should be focused on: 
 
    producers who are not using inputs because of market 
failure, 
    crops and geographical areas for which increased input 
use can induce a large supply shift (this may also require 
complementary  infrastructure  and  services for  input 
delivery, extension, and output markets), and 
    stimulating products with inelastic demand and supply, 
particularly inelastic demand, among poor producers and 
consumers (staple grain production  tends to have these 
characteristics in poor large or landlocked countries). 
 
The analysis also suggests the importance of consumer 
benefits in addition to (or rather than) producer benefits for 
achieving economic and welfare gains from subsidies; sub- 
sidy implementation  that  reduces deadweight losses and 
rents from straight transfers, leakages, and high administra- 
tive costs; and comparing distributional impacts and multi- 
pliers from expenditure on input subsidies with alternative 
(tax, subsidy, or other transfer) instruments  for changing 
income distribution and for stimulating growth. 
The conclusions from this neoclassical supply and 
demand  analysis influenced  conventional  wisdom  on  a 
number of difficulties with input subsidy programs: in con- 
trolling costs, in achieving “exit strategies” after subsidy pro- 
grams have become entrenched,  in  effective targeting of 
input subsidies to particular farmer types, in ensuring inputs 
are not overused, in controlling regressive benefits that favor 
larger farmers who can access subsidized inputs, and in pre- 
venting market distortions where parastatal involvement 
crowds out private sector investment in input supply systems 
and provides opportunities for corruption. 
In recent years, however, some scholars and many gov- 
ernment policy makers have departed from orthodox neo- 
classical thinking on input (particularly fertilizer) subsidies. 
Factors giving rise to this rethinking in Sub-Saharan Africa 
include perceptions by some that liberalization policies have 
failed to support sustainable intensification of staple food 
crop production; political demands for fertilizer subsidies; 
tensions among donors facing such demands; concerns 
about declining soil fertility; and interest in using input sub- 
sidies as an instrument for social protection policies and as 
a means of promoting input market development. 
On the basis of this analysis, Dorward (2009) suggests 
that the following design and implementation features are 
important  if subsidy programs are to be effective and effi- 
cient in stimulating increased productivity and broad-based 
growth: 
 
    Large unit (or percent) subsidies on rationed  supplies 
targeted to credit constrained farmers to reduce input 
affordability problems. 
    Targeting access to subsidized inputs for specific house- 
hold types where input use is constrained by the market 
failures that  the  program  effectively addresses; where 
these inputs can be used effectively and efficiently;10 and 
where substantial  political, economic, welfare, equity, 
and administrative challenges in effective and low-cost 
targeting can be overcome. 
    Rationing to control the costs of input subsidies with large 
per unit or percent subsidies and limited secondary mar- 
kets in which recipients sell subsidized inputs to others. 
    Encouragement of private sector input supply systems’ effi- 
ciency and  investments by economies of scale and  by 
competition in the sale of large volumes of inputs (espe- 
cially in remote and previously poorer and less productive 
areas and producers), with measures to limit uncertainty 
and the diversion of suppliers’ focus to capturing subsi- 
dized sales without developing retail systems. 
    Promotion of dynamic  effects on pro-poor growth through 
higher land and labor productivity in staple food pro- 
duction, lower food prices, and higher producer incomes 
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that facilitate wider nonagricultural development, mar- 
ket thickening, and reduced coordination  and transac- 
tion costs and risks in poor rural economies. 
    Effective and efficient entitlement and distribution sys- 
tems supporting targeting, rationing, supply system 
development, control of secondary markets and leakages, 
and cost control. A combination of paper vouchers (or 
coupons),11  scratch cards, and electronic systems 
(involving bank cards, electronic “smart” cards, mobile 
phones, or some combination of the three) may be used 
as evidence of entitlement. Different systems offer differ- 
ent potential benefits and political, technical, adminis- 
trative, and social challenges within communities  and 
households. Entitlements may be input specific or flexi- 
ble with regard to inputs allowed and may have a fixed 
value (with a variable top-up at redemption) or a vari- 
able value (with a fixed top-up). There are also impor- 
tant interactions between entitlement systems, secondary 
markets, recipient choice (of inputs and suppliers), con- 
trol of fraud and program costs, and gendered access to 
and control of subsidized inputs within households. 
    Complementary investments, policies, and  instruments 
critical for subsidy effectiveness and efficiency, with bal- 
anced investments in the subsidy program itself, research 
and extension support, transport  and communications 
infrastructure, and efficient and stable output markets.12 
    Matching of political interests with more technical and 
bureaucratic needs for cost control, limited leakages, tar- 
geting, rationing, and private sector development. 
 
Given the experience with subsidies in Africa discussed 
earlier, implementing some of these features is a major 
challenge. 
 
 
Issues to consider in evaluating agricultural 
input subsidies 
 
The success of an input subsidy program has to be judged 
against its objectives, and input subsidy programs can have 
a wide range of possible objectives: wider (pro-poor)  eco- 
nomic growth, benefits for poor consumers from lower out- 
put prices, national (or household) food self-sufficiency or 
security, increased input  adoption, increased efficiency of 
input use, benefits for poor producers, input supply system 
development, soil fertility replenishment, and political ben- 
efits. Most, but not all, of these objectives can be mutually 
complementary, depending on how a program is imple- 
mented. The balance of program objectives, and their context, 
should then determine the key design and implementation 
elements of input  subsidy programs  as discussed earlier. 
Figure 17.2 provides a conceptual framework that identifies 
key variables and relationships affecting input subsidy pro- 
gram impacts and guides this discussion of the Malawi 
Agricultural Input Subsidy Program. 
 
 
MALAWI’S 2005/06 TO 2008/09 EXPERIENCE 
WITH AGRICULTURAL INPUT SUBSIDIES 
 
Following severe food security difficulties in the early 2000s 
and in line with election commitments, the government of 
Malawi decided to implement a large national input subsidy 
program  for the 2005/06 growing season.13  The popular 
program has been repeated and expanded in subsequent 
seasons, building on core experience but also incorporating 
modifications in components and implementation systems 
from year to year. Core elements of the program common to 
the different years have been its use of vouchers targeting 
roughly 50 percent of farmers across the country for the 
receipt of fertilizers for maize production,  with further 
vouchers for improved maize seeds and for fertilizers for 
tobacco. The core objective of the program, which has been 
refined over time, has been twofold: to increase resource- 
poor smallholder farmers’ access to improved agricultural 
inputs in order to achieve food self-sufficiency, and to raise 
these farmers’ incomes through increased food and cash 
crop production. The main features of the program across 
the four years are summarized in table 17.2, and details of 
its design, implementation  and various achievements are 
detailed in the following sections. 
 
 
Program design and implementation 
 
The 2005/06 program provided the foundation  on which 
subsequent input  subsidy programs in Malawi have been 
built. We therefore describe this program  in more  detail 
before considering changes made in subsequent programs. 
The objective of the program was to promote access to and 
use of fertilizers in maize and tobacco production in order 
to increase agricultural productivity and food security. Fer- 
tilizer coupons were distributed to districts and within dis- 
tricts to extension planning areas in two rounds. In the first 
round,  allocation was broadly in proportion  to  cropped 
maize and tobacco areas. Coupons were distributed to dis- 
tricts and  Traditional  Authorities (TAs) by the  Ministry 
of Agriculture  and  Food  Security (MoAFS). TAs were 
supposed to allocate coupons to Village Development Com- 
mittees (VDCs), which were then supposed to identify 
recipients to receive two coupons that they could redeem, at 
296 CHAPTER 17: MALAWI’S AGRICULTURAL INPUT SUBSIDY PROGRAM  EXPERIENCE OVER 2005–09  
Figure 17.2 Conceptual Framework for Investigating Agricultural Input Subsidy Impacts 
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Table 17.2 Summary of Malawian Agricultural  Input Subsidy Programs, 2005/06 to 2008/09 
 
Indicator 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
Fertilizer voucher distribution (mt equivalent) 166,156 200,128 216,000 195,369 
Households receiving one or more fertilizer coupons (percent) — 54 59 65 
Subsidized fertilizer (mt For maize) 108,986 152,989 192,976 182,309 
For tobacco 22,402 21,699 23,578 19,969 
Total subsidized Planned 137,006 150,000 170,000 170,000 
fertilizer sales Actual 131,388 174,688 216,553 202,278 
Redemption price (MK/50-kilogram  bag) 950a 950 900 800 
Approximate voucher value, (MK/bag) 1,750 2,480 3,299 7,951 
Approximate  subsidy (%) 64 72 79 91 
Subsidized maize seed (mt) — 4,524 5,541 5,365 
Hybrid seed (%) 0 61 53 84 
Cotton seed (mt) 0 0 390 435 
Legume seed (mt) 0 0 24 — 
Cotton chemical vouchers 0 0 131,848 — 
Total program Planned 5,100 7,500 11,500 19,480 
cost (MK millions) Actual 7,200 12,729 16,346 39,847 
Sources: Logistics Unit reports; Nakhumwa 2006; SOAS et al. 2008; MoAFS 2008; Dorward and Chirwa 2009a; MoAFS implemen- 
tation guidelines; government of Malawi budget statistics; Dorward, Chirwa, and Slater 2010b; key informants. 
Note: — = not available; mt = metric tons. 
a. seed or fertilizer coupon (NSO 2008). 
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a reduced cash price, for any of four types of fertilizer. There 
was considerable variation within areas in the criteria deter- 
mining prioritization  and selection of beneficiaries, in 
numbers of people receiving coupons, and in numbers of 
coupons received per recipient household. A second, sup- 
plementary round  of coupon  allocation and distribution 
was made later in the season. Under the program, 6,000 
metric tons of open pollinated variety (OPV) maize seed 
was also offered for sale without coupons, at a subsidized 
price of MK 150 for a 3-kilogram bag, compared with the 
market price of MK 500. Although the parastatals 
ADMARC and SFFRFM were responsible for distributing 
subsidized inputs, 48 percent of subsided fertilizer was sup- 
plied by private sector importers. 
Holders of coupons were entitled to redeem coupons 
for fertilizer at the rate of one coupon and MK 950 for one 
50-kilogram bag of 23:21:0 +4S or urea (“maize fertilizers”), 
and at one coupon plus MK 1,450 per bag of Compound D 
or CAN (“tobacco fertilizers”). These prices represented, on 
average, a two-thirds subsidy to farmers on the market cost 
of inputs. Coupons intended for different types of fertilizer 
were not marked as such, and many coupons allocated for 
“tobacco fertilizer” may have been used to buy “maize fertil- 
izer” instead. Sales continued into January 2005, and in var- 
ious areas were limited either by a shortage of fertilizer stock 
or a shortage of coupons. In the latter case, supplementary 
coupons were used in some areas, but unavailability of fer- 
tilizer in time for it to be agronomically useful meant that 
significant numbers of coupons were not used. 
ADMARC/SFFRFM reported total sales of 131,803 metric 
tons of subsidized fertilizer (representing 2.62 million 
coupons).14 
Malawi’s 2005/06 agricultural input subsidy program is 
reported to have cost MK 7.2 billion, against a budget of MK 
5.1 billion (SOAS et al. 2008). The reported program cost 
excludes overhead costs for ADMARC and SFFRFM and 
likely allows for only partial deduction of farmer payments 
to ADMARC and SFFRFM for coupon redemption: these 
payments amounted to a total of MK 2.7 billion. 
Following the popularity of the 2005/06 program and 
the perception of its success, the government decided to 
implement the program in 2006/07 with a number of mod- 
ifications (table 17.3). These included an increase in the 
overall amount of maize fertilizers to be subsidized, a stan- 
dard redemption price of MK 950 per bag for all fertilizer 
types, improved coupon  security (with differentiation by 
fertilizer type), involvement of the Logistics Unit (a unit 
largely funded by the U.K. Department  for International 
Development, which had played a major role in the logistics 
of the nationwide starter pack and targeted input programs 
from 1998/99 to 2004/05), involvement of several large 
input supply companies in retail sales of subsidized fertilizer, 
and use of maize seed vouchers that could be exchanged at a 
wider range of outlets (including agro-dealers) for different 
quantities of OPV or hybrid seeds.15 The seed component, a 
portion  of the Logistic Unit’s  costs, and an independent 
 
 
 
Table 17.3 Principal Changes in Subsidy Program Design and Implementation, 2005/06 to 2008/09 
 
Year Subsidized inputs Voucher distribution system   Voucher redemption systems  Other system innovations 
2005/06 Maize and tobacco fertilizers, 
maize seed (OPV) 
2006/07 Maize and tobacco 
fertilizers, maize seed 
(hybrid and OPV) 
 
2007/08 Maize, tobacco, coffee, and 
tea fertilizers; maize seed 
(hybrid and OPV); legume 
seed (limited); cotton seed 
and chemicals 
2008/09 Maize and tobacco fertilizers; 
maize seed (hybrid and 
OPV); legume seed, cotton 
seed, and chemicals; maize 
storage chemicals 
District allocation by maize areas, 
distribution through TAs 
District allocation by maize areas, 
distribution  varied, through local 
government, TAs,VDCs, MoAFS 
 
District allocation by farm 
households and areas, 
distribution through 
MoAFS and VDCs 
 
District allocation by farm 
households  and areas; use of 
farm household register; open 
meetings for allocation and 
disbursement led by MoAFS 
Only through  SFFRFM 
and ADMARC 
Fertilizers also through major 
retailers; flexible maize seed 
vouchers through wide range 
of seed retailers 
Fertilizers also through major 
retailers; flexible maize and 
legume seed vouchers through 
wide range of seed retailers; 
cotton inputs through ADDs 
Fertilizers only through ADMARC 
and SFFRFM; flexible maize and 
seed vouchers through wide 
range of seed retailers; cotton 
inputs through ADDs 
None 
 
Coupons specific to fertilizer 
type; fertilizer buy-back 
system; involvement  of 
Logistics Unit 
Reduced copies of coupons; 
remote EPA premium; 
fertilizer buy-back system 
 
 
Extra coupon security 
features and market 
monitoring; no remote EPA 
premium; ADMARC 
computers for voucher 
processing 
 
Sources: Logistics Unit; Nakhumwa (2006); SOAS et al. (2008); MoAFS (2008); key informants; Dorward and Chirwa (2009a); MoAFS Implementation 
guidelines; NSO (2008). 
Note: EPA = Extension Planning Area. 
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program evaluation were funded by donors, who had not 
directly financed any part of the 2005/06 program (other 
than through budget support). Donors also funded a buy- 
back scheme, which reduced the risks to government  of 
holding unsold stocks at the end of the year if private sales 
led to  lower-than-expected  sales by ADMARC and 
SFFRFM. 
Planned and achieved subsidy sales and costs in 2006/07 
(and other years) are shown in table 17.2. Supplementary 
fertilizer voucher issues and the availability of fertilizer 
for  sales by private companies  (which  sold just under 
30 percent of subsidized sales) together led to higher sales 
volumes than budgeted. These, together with higher 
prices than budgeted, led to significant budget overruns. 
These problems were not  faced in seed sales, where no 
extra coupons were issued. 
Growing experience with the program led to consolida- 
tion in 2007/08 of many of the changes made in 2006/07, 
together with further changes to extend the scope of the 
program. Program objectives and beneficiary targeting cri- 
teria were amended to give greater emphasis to concerns for 
vulnerable households. Targeted quantities of subsidized 
maize fertilizer and seed were again increased, to roughly 
equal disbursements  to  the previous year. Changes were 
made to coupon allocation systems between districts to pro- 
vide greater weight to the number of farming households 
(and less weight to crop areas), leading to an increasing pro- 
portion of coupons allocated to the more densely populated 
southern region, where levels of poverty and poverty inci- 
dence are greatest. 
Following problems in some areas in 2006/07, systems 
for allocating and distributing coupons within districts were 
also modified in 2007/08 to give less power to TAs and more 
responsibility to MoAFS staff. In addition to the maize seed 
vouchers provided with maize fertilizer coupons, extra 
“flexible vouchers” allowed farmers  to  choose maize or 
legume seeds (although legume seed supplies were very lim- 
ited). A “remote area premium” was also introduced to pro- 
vide incentives to private retailers to extend their networks 
into areas with low coverage by private retailers; a premium 
was provided on the subsidy paid to private sector retailers 
for sales of subsidized fertilizers against identifiable vouch- 
ers issued to beneficiaries in designated “remote areas” with 
higher transport and distribution costs (with the vouchers 
identifiable by their location code). Coupons for cotton seed 
and chemicals were distributed through the MoAFS Divi- 
sional Offices (ADDs). 
Subsidized fertilizer volumes were again significantly 
over budget in 2007/08; with higher-than-budgeted  input 
prices, program  costs were 29 percent above the budget, 
compared with 18 percent the previous year. However, pri- 
vate sector subsidy sales were roughly the same as the previ- 
ous year (increasing by only 6 percent, from 49,000 metric 
tons to 52,000 metric tons), whereas parastatal sales 
increased by approximately 30 percent, from  125,000 to 
165,000 metric tons. 
A number of further changes were made to the 2008/09 
subsidy program. A farm household register compiled the 
previous year was updated and used to list coupon alloca- 
tions to individual beneficiaries in open village meetings led 
by teams involving MoAFS and local government staff. An 
attempt to print coupons in the government printer was fol- 
lowed by a significant security breach, and vouchers for the 
central and northern regions were then printed outside the 
country with extra security features. The flexible maize and 
legume seed voucher and cotton input systems were contin- 
ued. Grain pesticides were also subsidized, and some subsi- 
dized fertilizers were issued to tea and coffee farmers. 
Although private retailers were initially involved in the sale 
of subsidized fertilizers, this practice was discontinued at a 
very late stage in the season. The program went massively 
over budget, however, largely as a result of soaring interna- 
tional fertilizer costs, but  there was also an approximate 
15 percent overrun in quantities of inputs subsidized. 
 
 
Implementation achievements 
 
Three aspects of Malawi’s achievements in implementing 
its agricultural input subsidies are considered: program 
scale, innovation  and adaptation,  and implementation 
performance. 
 
Program scale. Malawi’s agricultural input subsidy pro- 
gram has grown each year since its creation and involves 
complex and very significant logistical and organizational 
challenges to tight deadlines. The major tasks of the pro- 
gram are shown in figure 17.3. This summary is highly 
simplified, however, and in practice a complex set of inter- 
actions between various stakeholders is needed to complete 
each task. In 2008/09 this process involved the selection of 
more than 1.5 million fertilizer coupon beneficiaries from 
more than 2.5 million farm households, printing and distri- 
bution of 5.9 million coupons, and purchase and distribu- 
tion of more than 3.4 million bags of fertilizer—all within 
tight deadlines. Further  challenges arise because farmers 
served by the program are widely dispersed across the coun- 
try (with a significant number being illiterate or semiliterate 
and  living in  remote  and  poorly  accessible areas), and 
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Figure 17.3 Major Tasks in Implementing Malawi’s Agricultural  Input Subsidy Program 
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because there is a constant threat of fraud or theft of program 
commodities worth a total of approximately $220 million, 
with each fertilizer coupon worth more than 10 percent of 
annual household income for the more than 40 percent of the 
population below the poverty line. 
The implementation challenges should not be underesti- 
mated, and it is significant that Malawi has been imple- 
menting such activities at varying scales annually since the 
inception of the starter pack program in 1998 (see below) 
and has therefore built up both systems and considerable 
expertise in these tasks. 
 
Innovation and  adaptation. The 2005/06 subsidy pro- 
gram built on Malawi’s innovative experience in imple- 
menting  the  starter  pack  and  targeted  input  programs 
(TIP). These programs involved large-scale registration and 
targeting across the country; development of systems using 
vouchers; coordination across different government, paras- 
tatal, private sector, donor,  and community  stakeholders; 
and substantial logistical challenges. The 2005/06 subsidy 
program, however, involved a change in objectives (from an 
emphasis on social protection and food security for vulner- 
able households in the TIP to national food production and 
self-sufficiency), an  increase  in  the  scale of  subsidized 
inputs (from approximately 50,000 metric tons of fertilizer 
in  2004/05 to  130,000 in  2005/06), and  the  addition  of 
tobacco inputs and cash redemption of vouchers. 
Following the experience of 2005/06, the government 
has, with other stakeholders, implemented further innova- 
tions to improve performance of the program and broaden 
its impact. These changes emerged from formal and infor- 
mal management and evaluation reviews and lesson learn- 
ing  within  the  government  (formal  internal  evaluations 
were conducted in 2006/07 and 2007/08); from discussions 
with other stakeholders (donors, private sector fertilizer 
importers, seed and fertilizer suppliers, a parliamentary 
committee on agriculture, and civil society); from external 
evaluations (commissioned by CISANet for 2005/06 and by 
the government, DFID, and USAID for 2006/07 and by the 
government and DFID for 2008/09); and shifts in policy 
within a changing economic and political environment. 
The major program modifications in 2006/07, 2007/08, 
and 2008/09, summarized in table 17.3, concerned: 
 
    the extent and modalities of private sector involvement in 
fertilizer imports, fertilizer sales, and seed sales, with a 
buy-back scheme to reduce government stockholding 
risks, a premium to stimulate private retail network 
development in more remote areas in 2007/08, and exclu- 
sion of the private sector from fertilizer sales in 2008/09; 
  recognition of the importance of including vulnerable 
households among targeted beneficiaries, with an 
increasing volume of inputs for maize production  and 
modified district/EPA allocation systems; 
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    trialing of flexible vouchers for seed inputs and addition 
of cotton inputs and grain storage pesticides; 
    introduction  of beneficiary registration and more open 
and more tightly managed beneficiary selection, voucher 
distribution, and market monitoring systems; 
    coupon design, printing, security, and farmer redemp- 
tion prices; and 
    sharing of the costs of some program components with 
donors. 
 
Implementation  performance.  Effectiveness and  effi- 
ciency of implementation can be assessed in terms of volume 
of subsidized inputs disbursed, timing of subsidy sales and 
supplier payments, targeted beneficiary access to inputs, and 
cost. As shown in table 17.2, both planned and disbursed vol- 
umes  of  subsidized  inputs  increased  steadily between 
2005/06 and 2008/09. Although fertilizer disbursement and 
sales targets were not met in 2005/06, they were exceeded in 
2006/07, 2007/08, and 2008/09 by 16 percent, 27 percent, and 
19 percent, respectively. Exceeding these targets demonstrates 
considerable success in meeting demand, but also suggests 
difficulties in controlling disbursement and cost overruns. 
Timing of subsidy sales is determined by the timing of 
availability of inputs in markets and the issue of vouchers to 
beneficiaries. Timing is critical for the effective use of seed 
and fertilizer at the start of the agricultural season. For fertil- 
izer, the timing of input availability depends upon timing of 
tendering of input  purchases and supplier deliveries to 
depots, the staffing and stocking of input markets (for paras- 
tatal sales), and subsidy redemption contracts with retailers 
and their stocking and staffing of input sales points for private 
sector sales. The timing of voucher issue depends on the tim- 
ing of beneficiary registration, voucher allocations, voucher 
printing, voucher distribution to districts, and district distri- 
bution payments. Information on some of these variables is 
given in table 17.4. In general, performance regarding earlier 
award of seed and fertilizer contracts and earlier fertilizer 
deliveries to depots and uplifts has improved over time. Infor- 
mation on the timing of fertilizer sales is incomplete, but it 
appears that despite some evidence of improvement between 
2005/06 and 2006/07 (not  shown in table 17.4), there has 
been little improvement since then. It is particularly impor- 
tant to increase sales by the end of November. These sales 
were highest in 2008/09 but still only 30 percent of the total. 
Receipt of seed vouchers by the Logistics Unit is determined 
by the timing of sales and the speed of voucher processing by 
seed suppliers; both were problematic in 2007/08. 
Targeted beneficiary access to inputs is determined  by 
coupon  allocation and issue and by the use of coupons, 
which may be affected by the availability of subsidy inputs 
in accessible markets and by any “tip” needed to redeem 
coupons. Household  surveys provide the only systematic 
information  available on  these areas. Results from  focus 
group  discussions and  household  surveys examining the 
2006/07 and 2008/09 programs (SOAS et al. 2008; Dorward, 
Chirwa, and Slater 2010a) suggest the following: 
 
    In 2008/09, 65 percent of farm households received one 
or more fertilizer coupons, with an average of 1.5 
coupons  per household  receiving coupons  and  of 1.1 
coupons per household across all households (figures for 
2006/07 were 54 percent, 1.7, and 1.0, respectively); 
    Targeting criteria were highly variable across different 
administrative areas;16 
    Overall targeting recommendations  were followed to 
some extent in that there was a tendency for targeting 
to reach households that are productive full-time 
farmers. However, household  survey data  for the  of 
2006/07 and 2008/09 seasons indicate that coupons 
were disproportionately targeted to households with 
relatively large amounts of land or other assets, and (in 
2006/07 but  not  in 2008/09) to male-headed house- 
holds. Smaller proportions  of fertilizer coupons were 
given to households in the bottom  half of the wealth 
and income distribution; 
    In some areas, particularly the south and center, coupon 
allocations were modified so that in 2008/09 just under 
40 percent of households in these regions and 36 percent 
nationally received one fertilizer coupon  (rather  than 
fewer households receiving two coupons); 
    Open meetings for coupon allocation were introduced in 
2008/09 and appear to have succeeded to some extent in 
increasing the proportion of coupons and subsidized fer- 
tilizer going to poorer households (Chirwa, Matita, and 
Dorward 2010); 
    Key informants  tended  to underestimate  the propor- 
tion  of households  receiving subsidized inputs  com- 
pared with estimates provided in interviews with 
households; 
    In 2006/07, 75 percent of ADMARC and private supplier 
outlets and 100 percent of SFFRFM outlets were reported 
to have suffered from frequent major queues; a similar 
figure of 75 percent was reported across ADMARC and 
SFFRFM outlets in 2008/09; 
    In both 2006/07 and 2008/09, household surveys indi- 
cated that 5 percent of coupons were reported to be 
accessed with some payment, with a median price of MK 
1,000 in 2006/07 and of MK 2,000 in 2008/09. 
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Table 17.4 Implementation Performance Indicators 2006/07–2008/09 
 
Indicator 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
Fertilizers 
Tender awards for parastatal supplies Late August Mid-August End-July 
 
Depot receipts end October (% of 
parastatal total sales) 32 58 53 
Depot receipts, end November 
(% of parastatal total sales) 77 76 71 
Outstanding payments, end Nov 
(% and MK millions) 28 1,216 22 1,595 16 3,500 
Outstanding payments, end Dec 
(% and MK millions) 46 4,303 13 1,192 13 3,690 
Outstanding  payments, end Jan 
(% and MK millions) 14 1,406 21 2,620 — 7,707 
Uplifts  dispatched as of end November 
(% of parastatal total sales) 64 70 75 
Total relocation transport costs 
(MK millions) — 68.4 42.0 
Finalization of retail fertilizer contracts Early Nov Mid/late Nov  — 
District voucher allocations Early Sept    Oct 9 Sept 12 
Voucher printing End Sept End Oct SR early Oct CR/NR early Nov 
Voucher and list distribution to 
districts completed Nov 7 Nov 3 Nov18 
Sales end Nov (% of total season sales) 8 — 30 
Sales end Dec (% of total season sales 74 — 68 
SFFRFM/ADMARC voucher returns 
end Dec (thousands) 0 101 175 
SFFRFM/ADMARC voucher returns 
end Jan (thousands) 111 720 1,057 
Finalization of seed supply contracts Mid/late Nov Mid/late Nov Early Nov 
Seed coupons in LU end Dec 
(% of season sales) 27 4 6 
Seed coupons in LU end Jan 
(% of season sales) 74 18 22 
 
Sources: Logistics Unit reports; Nakhumwa (2006); SOAS et al. (2008); MoAFS (2008); key informants. 
Note: Data are not available for 2005/06. LU = Logistics Unit. — = not available. 
 
    In 2006/07 a “tip” was paid to retail market  staff for 
redemption  of about  20 percent of fertilizer coupons, 
with a mean price per bag of just over MK 1,000 (com- 
pared with the official price of MK 950) and with no 
significant overall differences between parastatal  and 
private sector suppliers. In 2008/09, 14 percent of fertil- 
izer coupons were reported to require a “tip” for redemp- 
tion, with a median “tip” of 200 MK, again giving a price 
of MK 1,000 per bag. 
 
There are considerable difficulties in determining  the 
extent to which fraud affects Malawi’s  agricultural input 
subsidy program. Fraud can arise in a number  of ways— 
through allocation of vouchers to nonexistent beneficiaries 
(and their diversion to government staff, traditional leaders, 
or politicians), direct allocation of vouchers to people who 
do not satisfy beneficiary criteria, printing of extra or coun- 
terfeit vouchers, and payment of “tips.” 
Determining the extent of the fraud is rendered difficult 
by the lack of formal and transparent audit systems cover- 
ing the whole program and by discrepancies between 
MoAFS and NSO estimates of the total number  of farm 
households in Malawi (MoAFS estimates of farm house- 
holds were 33 percent above NSO estimates in 2006/07 and 
47 percent above NSO estimates in 2008/09). SOAS et al. 
(2008) concluded that there is insufficient evidence to sug- 
gest widespread fraud, and that household survey estimates 
of subsidized fertilizer access were broadly compatible with 
the MoAFS farm household estimates, but there are numer- 
ous anecdotal reports of fraud within the system. Although 
Dorward, Chirwa, and Slater (2010b) suggest that NSO may 
well underestimate the number  of farm households in 
Malawi, it seems unlikely that underestimate could be off by 
a third, and there are risks (and anecdotal reports) of 
increasing numbers of villages and of some “ghost villages,” 
suggesting significant diversion of subsidized inputs away 
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from the intended beneficiaries. The discrepancy between 
NSO and MoAFS estimates of the number of farm families 
is being jointly examined by the NSO and MoAFS to resolve 
this issue. 
Regarding the extent to which counterfeit or nonstan- 
dard vouchers (those with serial numbers outside the ranges 
recorded by the Logistics Unit) have been accepted by dif- 
ferent outlets, records for 2007/08 show that these (and sales 
without vouchers) accounted for 27 percent of ADMARC/ 
SFFRFM sales and 3 percent of private retailer sales (LU 
2009). Rapid return  of vouchers to the Logistics Unit  is 
important  for early identification of markets accepting 
counterfeit or nonstandard  vouchers. Private retailers gen- 
erally return coupons quickly in order to receive payment, 
but ADMARC and SFFRFM have been much slower at this 
task although their voucher returns have improved over the 
three years for which records are available (see table 17.4). A 
major security breach in the printing of vouchers in 2008/09 
led to reprinting of more secure vouchers for issue in two 
regions. 
Overall, the costs of Malawi’s subsidy program were over 
budget and increasing from 2005/6 to 2008/9 (table 17.5), 
due to a combination  of increasing subsidy volumes and 
large increases in fertilizer prices. Program costs were just 
over 40 percent above the budget for 2005/06 and 2006/07, 
nearly 50 percent over budget in 2007/08, and 90 percent 
over budget in 2008/09. Program costs rose from just over 
60 percent of the MoAFS budget in 2006/07 and 2007/08, 
rising to 74 percent in 2008/09, when the program 
accounted for over 15 percent of the total national budget. 
It is, however, important to note that for the 2009/10 pro- 
gram, actual costs were 21 percent below budget and costs 
fell back sharply, by 41 percent, because of both a halving of 
fertilizer prices and a 20 percent reduction in the amount of 
fertilizer disbursed, which was almost exactly on budget. As 
a result program costs fell back to 7 percent of the total 
national budget. 
Data on estimated per unit fertilizer costs and on total 
program costs, excluding ADMARC overhead costs, are also 
given in table 17.5. As shown in the table, fertilizer prices 
and transport costs rose from 2005/06 to 2008/09. The esti- 
mated  per unit  fertilizer cost increases from  2005/06 to 
2006/07 in Malawi (25 percent) are higher than would be 
expected given that international  prices were static over 
the same period, but  from 2006/07 to 2007/08 the price 
increase (22 percent) was markedly lower than the increase 
in international prices, which rose by around 50 percent or 
more, so the overall cost increase in Malawi over 2005/06 to 
2007/08 was in line with international price increases. 
Fertilizer cost increases from 2007/08 to 2008/09 also appear 
to have been roughly in line with increases in international 
price increases over the same period (about 125 percent). 
 
 
 
Table 17.5 Fertilizer and Program Costs in Malawi 2005/06–2009/10 
 
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
Planned Actual Planned Actual Planned Actual Planned Actual Actual 
Fertilizer cost ($/mt): 
Parastatal: delivered 
at depots — — — 454 — 555a — 1,204b 575 
Parastatal: transport, etc. — — — 36 — 45 — 46 39 
Parastatal: total — 393 — 490 — 600 — 1,250 614 
Private retailers: total —  ... — 490 — 612 —  ...    ... 
Average all suppliers — 393 — 490 — 590 — 1,250 614 
Program costs: 
Malawi government 36.4 51.4 51.4 81.4 73.6 109.6 127 227.7 137.6 
Donors ($ millions) 0 0 12.5 9.5 5.7 7.1 12.1 37.8 17.5 
Total ($ millions) 36.4 51.4 63.9 90.9 79.3 116.8 139.1 265.4 155.1 
Net of farmer payments — 32 — 73.9 — 95.4 — 242.3 143.7 
Total as % MoAFS  budget — — 43 61 51 61 61 74 — 
Total as % national  budget  4.3  5.6   5.4   8.4   6.7   8.9   8.5 16.2  6.7 
Total as % of GDP — 2.1 3.1 — 3.4 — 6.6 — 
 
Sources: Logistics Unit; Nakhumwa (2006); SOAS et al. (2008); MoAFS (2008); Dorward and Chirwa (2009a); Government of Malawi budget 
statistics; key informants. 
Note: The 2005/06 fertilizer costs may also include some seed and coupon production/distribution costs. Parastatal transport etc., costs exclude 
ADMARC overheads. Program costs exclude buy-back carried forward. — = not available.  ... = not applicable. 
a. Excluding costs of buy-back brought forward. 
b. Including costs of buy-back brought forward. 
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Marked monthly variation in international fuel prices from 
mid- to late 2006 and 2007 makes it difficult to calculate 
equivalent figures for transport costs. 
Aside from  the problems of high fertilizer prices in 
2008/09, the 2006/07 to 2008/09 programs faced major 
challenges in controlling the volume of subsidized fertil- 
izer disbursed. Three alternative (and complementary) 
approaches to limiting the volume may be used: control- 
ling the number of coupons issued, controlling the physi- 
cal stock of fertilizer available, and controlling sales of 
fertilizer by closing further  sales once the total budget 
quantity has been sold. In principle, the first option is the 
best approach, although it is undermined  by counterfeit 
coupons and by any high-level political pressure that may 
demand extra coupon issues. Control of physical stock of 
fertilizer (the method used in 2009/10) is difficult if the 
private sector is involved in retail subsidy, and may result 
in genuine beneficiaries being denied the opportunity  to 
redeem genuine coupons. Closure of the program once 
target sales have been achieved suffers from the latter dis- 
advantage, and in addition requires timely reporting and 
monitoring of sales. 
The rising costs of the subsidy program over the period 
were met by increasing budgetary allocations to the MoAFS, 
and did not crowd out other MoAFS activities in terms of 
actually cutting budgetary allocations to them. However, the 
opportunity cost of the program is an issue in terms of for- 
gone investments that could have been achieved with those 
funds. The program also consumes very large amounts of 
staff time and other resources, for people must be diverted 
from other activities to manage and implement the subsidy 
program in the critical time before and at the start of the 
cropping season. Similarly, while financial resources allo- 
cated to the subsidy program have grown dramatically since 
the start of the program, financial resources allocated to 
other activities have remained largely static or shown only 
small increases, posing severe challenges to other essential 
research and extension activities of the Ministry. 
 
 
Input supply impacts 
 
Malawi’s subsidy program has had major, and mixed, 
impacts on private sector input suppliers. These effects have 
to be considered separately for fertilizer importers, fertilizer 
retailers, seed suppliers, and seed retailers. For retailers of 
seed and fertilizer, it is important  to distinguish between 
small independent agro-dealers on one hand and retail out- 
lets of larger companies involved in importation  and both 
wholesale and retail sales on the other. 
Fertilizer importers have been responsible for generally 
increasing proportions and volumes of government subsidy 
sales, with particularly large volumes in 2008/09 (table 17.6). 
Importers have clearly benefited from their growing share in 
imports, although they have faced some difficulties from 
exposure to foreign exchange losses caused by delays in pay- 
ments in local currency. Insofar as currency risks are fac- 
tored  into  tender  margins, these raise fertilizer costs for 
government. Some importers have expressed concerns 
about increasing competition in import tenders from new 
players without proper qualification criteria, leading to the 
award of some tenders to suppliers who are unable to 
deliver. If the award of such tenders leads to late cancellation 
and reordering at short notice, they may also raise fertilizer 
costs for the government. 
Maize seed suppliers have also benefited from significant 
growth in sales over the life of the program (see table 17.2). 
Government and the seed suppliers association negotiate 
prices, which involves a difficult balance between competi- 
tion and coordination in supply. The subsidy program 
affects retail sales through three processes, each of which has 
a different effect on whether retail outlets sell subsidized 
inputs. These are set out in table 17.7. 
Displacement of commercial sales occurs when a farmer 
chooses not to buy an input received on subsidy when he 
or she would have bought it commercially if the subsidy 
had not been available. This affects private retail outlets 
irrespective of their participation as subsidy retailers. Dis- 
placement is difficult to estimate because even without sub- 
sidies, farmers’ commercial purchases change from year to 
year with changes in input prices, output  prices, and their 
access to seasonal finance. Input suppliers appear to be very 
concerned about losses of fertilizer sales through displace- 
ment if these are not counteracted by gains in subsidized 
sales and customers from participation  in the subsidy 
scheme. Displacement rates have been estimated from 
examination of changes in aggregate sales (SOAS et al. 2008) 
 
 
 
Table 17.6  Private Sector Involvement in 
Subsidized Fertilizer Sales 
 
Private sector 
involvement 2005/06    2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
Subsidized tender 
deliveries (mt) 70,000 99,386 97,845 162,840 
Subsidized tender 
deliveries (%) 48 72 71 88 
Retail sales (%) 0 28 24 0 
 
Source: Logistics Unit; SOAS et al. 2008; Dorward and Chirwa 2009a. 
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Table 17.7 Impacts of Subsidy Program on Seed and Fertilizer Private Retail Outlets 
 
Processes by which the subsidy 
program affects retail sales Participating retail outlets Excluded retail outlets 
Displacement of commercial  sales 
by subsidy sales 
Loss of sales Loss of sales 
Sales of subsidized inputs Gain in sales No effect 
Gain/loss of customers going to outlets 
to redeem their subsidy vouchers 
General increases in demand  as a result 
of program-induced growth and income/ 
cash gains in previous season 
Gain in sales Loss of sales 
 
Gain in sales Gain in sales 
Private fertilizer retailers Retail chains in 2006/07 and 2007/08 Agro-dealers in all years, retail chains 
in 2005/06 and 2008/09 
Private seeds retailers Agro-dealers  and retail chains from 
2006/07 to 2008/09 
Agro-dealers  and retail chains in 2005/06 
only 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
 
 
and from panel data analysis of farmer purchases (Ricker- 
Gilbert, Jayne, and Chirwa 2011). 
Displacement estimates from examination of changes in 
aggregate sales were 20–30 percent in 2005/06 and 30–40 
percent in 2006/07, with displacement for tobacco fertilizers 
higher than that for maize fertilizers (SOAS et al. 2008). Dis- 
placement estimated from  panel data  analysis of farmer 
purchases was 23 percent for 2006/07 (Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne, 
and Chirwa 2011) and 3 percent for 2008/09 (Ricker-Gilbert 
and Jayne 2010), but in all years some further displacement 
may be expected if some subsidized fertilizers are not 
received by smallholders. Estimating displacement from 
aggregate fertilizer sales for 2007/08 and 2008/09 has not 
been possible due to lack of data on aggregate commercial 
sales. Table 17.8 shows incremental fertilizer use estimates 
for 2005/06 and 2006/07 and predictions for 2007/08 and 
2008/09, assuming similar implementation in these years.17 
Displacement of maize seed sales appears to be much lower, 
with strong growth in commercial seed sales in 2006/07. 
As table 17.7 shows, however, overall impacts of the sub- 
sidy program on input sales depend not only on displace- 
ment  effects but  also on  the  impact  of participation  or 
exclusion in the program on subsidy sales and on customers 
visiting the outlet. The last two lines of the table identify the 
status of agro-dealers and retail outlets for larger companies 
with regard to subsidized fertilizer and seed sales. Notably, 
both reported a significant increase in sales in 2006/07 when 
they were able to participate in subsidized seed sales and in 
subsidized fertilizer sales (only retail outlets for larger com- 
panies) (Kelly, Boughton, and Lenski 2010). Conversely, the 
exclusion of the private sector from all retail subsidy sales in 
2005/06 led to a substantial drop in reported fertilizer sales 
from  all  retail  outlets.  Sales recovered  in  2006/07 and 
2007/08 for the larger importers  with retail outlets with 
their inclusion in retail subsidy sales, but  they again 
reported declines in retail outlet fertilizer sales when they 
were excluded from the program in 2008/09 (Kelly, 
Boughton, and Lenski 2010). Small agro-dealers had been 
excluded from retail sales of fertilizer subsidies during all 
four seasons of the program. 
 
 
Maize market impacts 
 
The input subsidy program may affect maize markets in a 
number of ways. We identify four potential impacts: 
 
    Direct impact through increased supply of maize for sale 
and reduced demand for purchases by net surplus and 
deficit farmers; 
    Indirect impacts as a result of policy changes influenced 
by the subsidy; 
    In the longer term, if the subsidy program leads to rising 
incomes, demand for maize should increase as a result of 
consumption by both humans and livestock; 
    Finally, if the net effect of these impacts is to lower (or 
raise) maize prices, then a supply response to increase (or 
reduce) resources allocated to maize production  should 
be expected. 
 
These impacts arise in the context of wider changes in 
production (as a result of seasonal weather), in policies, in 
regional and  national  maize markets, and  in urban  and 
rural incomes (as a result of other processes of livelihood 
change and growth). Although data and analytical limita- 
tions make it difficult to tease out these different influences, 
Malawi does have good information  on maize prices. As 
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Table 17.8 Estimated Incremental Fertilizer Sales and Maize Production, 2005/06–2008/09 
 
Indicator  2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
Incremental fertilizer sales as % of subsidy sales 70–80 60–70 60–70 90 
Incremental fertilizer use (mt)  98,541 113,547 140,760 181,800 
Incremental  seed use (mt) OPV 3,000 1,764 2,604 833 
 Hybrid 0 2,760 2,937 4,532 
Yield response as % of 2008/09 estimate 80 100 70 100 
Subsidy program  incremental  maize Medium estimate 406,348 647,474 566,235 968,900 
production estimates (mt) Above 2002/03 and 2003/04 273,609 514,735 433,496 836,161 
 High estimate: +20 percent 487,618 776,969 679,482 1,162,800 
 Above 2002/03 and 2003/04 328,332 617,683 520,196 1,003,514 
 Low estimate: –20 percent 325,078 517,979 452,988 775,200 
 Above 2002/03 and 2003/04 218,887 411,788 346,797 669,009 
National crop production estimates Increment above 2002/03 
and 2003/04 (mt) 975,262 1,698,956 1,031,938 2,031,816 
Net maize exports in following year (exports minus imports, mt) –78,491 224,972 –101,027 –50,398 
 
Source: Incremental fertilizer and seed sales figures are from Dorward and Chirwa (2009a). Figures for yield response and incremental seed impact 
for 2008/09 are from Dorward and Chirwa (2010). National crop estimates are from MoAFS. Net maize exports are from Jayne et al. (2010). 
Note: Production seasons 2002/03 and 2003/04 are considered nondrought years for presubsidy comparisons, although targeted input subsidies of 
35,000 and 22,000 metric tons of fertilizer were provided in these years, and a 10 percent displacement is assumed for these years. OPV sales for 
2005/06 are estimated to be 50 percent of budgeted sales. 
 
 
noted earlier, prices have varied widely in the past, and, as 
shown in figure 17.4, variability has continued in the period 
of subsidy implementation—indeed,  maize prices reached 
historic highs in early 2009. 
High maize prices would not be expected given the large 
maize production  estimates in each subsidy year—rather, 
low prices would be expected.18 Low prices were observed in 
the 2006/07 marketing season (following the 2005/06 sub- 
sidy) and initially in 2007/08 (following the 2006/07 sub- 
sidy). In the latter year, however, prices rose toward the end 
of the season, so that the maximum monthly price within the 
year was high, although substantially larger estimated pro- 
duction as compared with the previous year should have led 
to lower prices. Prices following the 2007/08 subsidy were 
even higher, with average annual prices exceeding those of 
the 2001/02 and 2005/06 famine years,19 but these high 
prices did not lead to any reports of widespread suffering 
and distress such as those experienced in previous years with 
equivalent prices. Prices in the first half of the 2009/10 sea- 
son (following the 2008/09 subsidy) were considerably lower 
than in the previous year, although the estimated production 
was still very high by historical standards (figure 17.5). 
A number of explanations for this pattern of prices and 
estimated production may be put forward: 
 
    In 2007/08, roughly 330,000 metric tons of maize were 
exported. In 2009/10, 130,000 tons were purchased by 
government for the strategic grain reserve (SGR), and a 
further 100,000 tons are estimated to have been bought 
and held in storage by private traders (FEWSNet 2009). 
Exports and purchases of stocks to carry over to the fol- 
lowing season would reduce maize volumes (this would 
not be the case for 2009/10 SGR and other stock pur- 
chases subsequently sold later in the 2009/10 season). 
The effect of this on figure 17.5 would be to shift the 
2006/07 and 2008/09 subsidy figures to the left by around 
300,000 and 100,000 metric tons, respectively.20 This 
does not, however, bring the three later subsidy years 
anywhere near the pattern  of the 1993/94, 1995/96 to 
2004/05, and 2006/07 seasons. Indeed, there were reports 
of maize imports of roughly 50,000 tons from Mozam- 
bique and  36,000 tons  from  South Africa during  the 
2008/09 season (FEWSNet 2009; South African Revenue 
Service 2009). 
    Rising real incomes alongside falling poverty rates and 
rising population  may lead to rising national demand, 
which would cause the 1995/96 to 2004/05 demand to 
increase over time—but  not as suddenly and dramati- 
cally as shown in figure 17.5. Such a trend is compatible 
with the lack of distress in later years despite high prices. 
    Storage losses may be rising as a result of increasing pro- 
duction of hybrid maize promoted  by the 2006/07 and 
subsequent subsidy programs. However, 2009 household 
survey results suggest that storage losses are not particu- 
larly high, with 50 percent of respondents reporting no 
losses in the 2007/08 and 2008/09 storage years and only 
a little over 20 percent reporting high losses (Dorward 
and Chirwa 2009b). Mangisoni (2010) also reports rela- 
tively low storage losses, in the range of 12 percent over a 
10-month period. 
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Figure 17.4 Mean Annual Maize Price in Malawi, by Marketing  Season 
 
0.40 
 
0.35 
 
0.30 
 
0.25 
 
0.20 
 
0.15 
 
0.10 
 
0.05 
 
0 
 
Subsidy years 
 
 
 
Source: MoAFS. 
Note: Maize prices are simple averages across all markets obtained from weekly surveys, all deflated to 1990 prices. 
 
 
 
Figure 17.5 Peak Monthly  Maize Prices in Malawi by Estimated Maize Supply per Capita, by Season 
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    Higher welfare and real incomes following the 2005/06 
harvest and low maize prices led to greater retention and 
consumption of the 2006/07 harvest and hence a thinner 
and tighter market. 
    Changes in informal cross-border flows could also have 
occurred (Jayne et al. 2010). 
    Finally, national maize production  following the imple- 
mentation of the subsidy program could have been over- 
estimated. Although there are no clear changes in 
methodology in the last few years, the method appears to 
rely substantially on field workers’ subjective estimates of 
crop area and yield, which may be affected by the very 
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substantial involvement of field workers in the subsidy 
program. Production impacts of the subsidy program are 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
None of these explanations (except possibly the last) can 
fully explain the high prices despite the high estimated pro- 
duction following the 2006/07, 2007/08, and 2008/09 sub- 
sidy programs. To illustrate this, figure 17.5 plots maximum 
monthly price against estimated per capita net maize sup- 
ply. From the 1993/94 to 2004/05 production seasons, there 
was a roughly downward sloping relationship, with high 
prices following years of low supply and low prices in years 
following high supply (although the 2002/03 and 2003/04 
seasons do not fit this relationship). Prices following the 
first (2005/06) subsidy fit this pattern. The three subsequent 
seasons, however, when prices were high despite high esti- 
mates of production, do not fit this pattern. 
Two clear and important  conclusions emerge from this 
analysis. First, in three out of four years, the subsidy pro- 
gram did not lead to lower market prices for maize. Second, 
the subsidy program has not led to increases in maize sup- 
ply as large as those suggested by increases in maize crop 
estimates from 2006/07 onward, particularly in 2007/08 and 
2008/09, when prices appeared to be very high compared 
with estimated supplies. We therefore consider estimates of 
the subsidy programs impacts on production. 
 
 
Production impacts 
 
The major stated objectives of Malawi’s  subsidy program 
have been to achieve food self-sufficiency and to increase 
the incomes of resource-poor households through 
increased food and cash crop production.  Increased pro- 
duction is therefore critical to achievement of program 
objectives. This  results  from  incremental  use  of  inputs 
(mainly fertilizers and seeds) leading to increased yields, 
with yield responses to these inputs dependent  upon  the 
weather and the efficiency of input use and of crop produc- 
tion. Estimated incremental fertilizer sales were discussed 
earlier in terms of the effects of displacement on input sup- 
ply markets. Incremental fertilizer sales are also important 
for estimating the  incremental  production  effects of the 
program, with responses to fertilizer depending upon rain- 
fall, crop  variety, and  management  (including  timing  of 
planting, weeding, and  timing  and  methods  of fertilizer 
application), and soil fertility. 
SOAS et al. (2008) and Dorward and Chirwa (2009a) cal- 
culate estimated  incremental  production  for  2005/06 to 
2007/08 using a range of 12 to 18 kilograms of grain per 
kilogram of nitrogen. Results from crop-cutting survey esti- 
mates in the 2008/09 crop year demonstrate that substantial 
problems in obtaining precise estimates of crop responses21 
make it difficult to obtain precise estimates of incremental 
production  from the subsidy program. They do, however, 
support the broad response of 12 to 18 kilograms of grain 
per kilogram of fertilizer, with 15 kilograms per hectare a 
reasonable “medium expectation.” Using different estimates 
of incremental fertilizer use and of yield responses gives dif- 
ferent estimates of incremental production as a result of the 
input subsidy program. Table 17.8 sets out such estimates by 
year of implementation. 
For each year estimated, incremental fertilizer use is mul- 
tiplied by a grain-to-nitrogen response ratio adjusted to 
reflect differing conditions in subsidy implementation 
between years (good  weather but  very little hybrid seed 
in 2005/06 compared with 2008/09; similar conditions in 
2006/07 but a bit less hybrid seed; late fertilizer delivery 
in the southern region and only slightly more hybrid seed in 
2007/08). This is added  to  a yield gain from  subsidized 
hybrid seed separate from fertilizer to arrive at an estimate 
of total incremental maize production  from the subsidy.22 
High and low estimates are, respectively, 20 percent above 
and below the 2008/09 medium estimate (which averaged 
15 kilograms of grain per kilogram of fertilizer across 
hybrid and local seed plots). 
While the estimates in table 17.8 are necessarily approxi- 
mate, indeed indicative, as noted above, they nevertheless 
demonstrate several important points: 
 
  Incremental production  is very sensitive to yield 
responses to inputs (hybrid seed and fertilizers) and the 
potential is therefore considerable for raising yields and 
yield responses with good subsidy program  and  crop 
management—with early subsidy sales, planting and fer- 
tilizer application, high plant populations, and greater 
use of organic matter, for example. 
    Not explicitly shown in table 17.8 is the importance of 
hybrid seed in raising yield responses to fertilizer. 
Increasing hybrid seed sales (subsidized or unsubsidized) 
is therefore another potential way of increasing subsidy 
impacts on incremental production.23 
    Incremental production  estimates are considerable, and 
they grow over the life of the program as a result of the 
increasing volume of incremental fertilizer use and 
increasing supply of hybrid seed. 
    Incremental production estimates are, however, consid- 
erably less than the production increases estimated in the 
national crop estimates for maize production  since the 
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start of the subsidy program, and these differences are 
too large to be explained by upward revision of the yield 
response to fertilizer.24 
    Differences in production  between presubsidy and sub- 
sidy years as estimated above are more compatible with 
price differences between these years as shown in figure 
17.5 (for example the export of 330,000 metric tons fol- 
lowing the 2006/07 harvest would more than cancel out 
the increased subsidy impact that year, compared with 
2005/06). The very high prices in 2007/08 remain a puzzle 
but may be explained by the subsidy program’s  incre- 
mental production  being insufficient to counteract pro- 
duction losses from adverse conditions affecting all maize 
in some parts of the country (late subsidized input delivery 
and local events such as flooding and drought spells). 
 
 
Macroeconomic impacts 
 
The large size of Malawi’s subsidy program could be 
expected to have macroeconomic impacts. As a proportion 
of  total  government  expenditure,  the  subsidy increased 
from 5.6 percent in 2005/06 to 8.4 percent in 2006/07 to 8.9 
percent in 2007/08. With very large increases in fertilizer 
prices and costs for 2008/09, actual expenditure on the sub- 
sidy rose to 16.2 percent of total government expenditure 
(see table 17.5). As a proportion  of gross domestic product 
(GDP), subsidy program  costs rose from  2.1 percent  in 
2005/06 to 3.4 percent in 2007/08 and to 6.6 percent in 
2008/09 (excluding remittance by ADMARC and SFFRFM 
of the farmer’s redemption price to government). (As noted 
earlier and shown in table 17.5, program costs have subse- 
quently fallen back markedly.) 
On the positive side, estimates of GDP growth have been 
significantly affected by large increases in estimated maize 
production  since the implementation  of the subsidy pro- 
gram. Estimates of incremental production  attributable to 
the subsidy program are not as high but are nevertheless 
very large, and incremental maize production and increases 
in land and labor productivity in maize production attrib- 
utable to the program should have had a significant positive 
impact on GDP growth. 
No evidence of negative macroeconomic impacts was 
found in the subsidy’s first two years (SOAS et al. 2008). 
Important contributors to GDP were sound macroeconomic 
management; improving macroeconomic indicators includ- 
ing growth, inflation, and government deficit (table 17.9); 
and increased growth across the economy at that time; and 
the  subsidy  program  itself  was  a  contributor   to  that 
growth (good tobacco prices, good weather for agricultural 
 
Table 17.9  Trends in Macroeconomic Performance 
Indicators, 2005–09 
(percent) 
 
Indicator 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Real GDP growth 3.3 6.7 8.6 9.7 6.9 
Inflation 15.4 13.9 8.0 8.7 10.1 
Deficit/GDP 
ratio (budget) 2.6 1.5 1.8 1.9 3.7 
Deficit/GDP 
ratio (actual) 0.4 1.4 4.0 6.3 8.0 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi 2010. 
 
 
production,  and  improved  macroeconomic  management 
and conditions were other important  contributors). 
Improved macroeconomic management, together with 
budgetary support from donors, was also undoubtedly 
important in enabling the government to finance such a 
large program. 
The situation was, changing, however, as increasing vol- 
umes and increasing prices in subsequent years led to very 
high cost overruns. At the same time, Malawi’s economy was 
facing a number of internal and external pressures that led to 
adverse changes in macroeconomic indicators. The subsidy 
program both contributed  to and was affected by these 
macroeconomic changes, this time adversely (other macro- 
economic pressures were very high government expenditure 
and import  costs for the subsidy program  with high fuel 
costs, high maize prices, other government expenditures, and 
lower tobacco prices), although the incremental maize pro- 
duction  from the subsidy program  should have exerted a 
downward influence on maize prices. In a fixed exchange 
rate environment, these pressures contributed  to a foreign 
exchange crisis in Malawi in November and December 2009. 
Very high budgetary and foreign exchange allocations to 
the subsidy program also reduced funding available to activ- 
ities such as health, education, and infrastructure develop- 
ment. It is clear that the 2008/9 level of spending on the pro- 
gram was not sustainable, and as noted earlier the 
government is addressing this: although the very high fertil- 
izer prices in the 2008/09 season were a temporary phe- 
nomenon, the government has committed itself to control- 
ling costs by limiting the volume of subsidized fertilizers in 
future years. It has also restricted the subsidy to inputs for 
the production of only maize. 
 
 
Economic returns 
 
Economic returns  to  Malawi’s  subsidy program  depend 
upon the economic price of maize, the price of inputs, and 
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production responses to increased input use. Producer ben- 
efit-cost ratios estimated for the 2006/07 program showed 
that the net economic return to the project is very sensitive 
to maize prices and the production response, and, with rea- 
sonable variation in assumptions, these ratios range from 
0.81 to  1.30, with a mid  estimate of 1.06 (table 17.10). 
Adjustments to this analysis using estimated maize and fer- 
tilizer prices for other program years suggest that both the 
2005/06 and 2007/08 programs should have yielded equiva- 
lent or higher returns. However, the very high fertilizer 
prices that prevailed when fertilizers were being purchased 
for  the  2008/09 program  adversely affected returns  in 
2008/09, despite good weather and yields and high maize 
prices (although these did offset the effects of high fertilizer 
prices to some extent). 
Fiscal efficiency estimates (net  economic  benefit per 
unit of fiscal investment) show a similar pattern  to eco- 
nomic returns, but in addition these are (negatively) 
affected by high rates of displacement of unsubsidized sales 
by subsidized sales (displacement lowers the net benefit of 
subsidized sales). Key conclusions from the benefit-to-cost 
and fiscal efficiency analyses are that economic returns are 
highly sensitive to the yield response to fertilizer (as dis- 
cussed earlier under production impacts); fiscal returns are 
highly sensitive to displacement rates; and with good pro- 
gram implementation and good (but achievable) yield 
responses to  fertilizer, the program  can be a very good 
investment. It is therefore critical that the program design 
and implementation deliver low displacement and high 
responses to inputs. 
 
 
Growth and poverty reduction impacts 
 
While the producer benefit-cost and fiscal efficiency analy- 
ses can yield valuable information  about the efficiency of 
the subsidy program, they can be misleading when examin- 
ing the contributions of the program to poverty reduction, 
economic growth, and food security. Understanding the full 
economic benefits of the program requires consideration of 
the direct effects of the program on subsidy recipients and 
of the different ways that these effects subsequently work 
through  their  own and  others’  livelihoods and  the rural 
economy. Because the program is large, it is very important 
for the wider market effects of the intervention to be prop- 
erly recognized. 
Figure 17.6 shows three possible uses of the subsidy by 
subsidy recipients: reselling of coupons  or  of subsidized 
inputs, incremental use of the inputs in production, or use 
of the inputs  with displacement of purchase of unsubsi- 
dized inputs. These should lead to two main types of direct 
benefit for recipients: immediate income transfers (from 
reselling of coupons or subsidized inputs or from reduced 
expenditure on inputs as a result of displacement of unsub- 
sidized purchases by cheaper, subsidized purchases), or 
incremental production at harvest if the inputs are used on 
farm. If poorer households sell their coupon(s), then imme- 
diate income and welfare gains should also be accompanied 
by an easing of short-term  seasonal cash constraints. This 
easing may reduce the extent to which they have to hire out 
their own labor (as casual ganyu labor) to obtain food, thus 
allowing them  to  work more  on  their  own farms, both 
increasing end-of-season yields and reducing the supply of 
labor into the local labor market. At the same time, if less 
poor households obtain cheaper inputs  directly from the 
program or buy those inputs from subsidy recipients, then 
this increase in income should increase their demand for 
hired-on  farm labor or for local goods and services. The 
result should be a tightening of both demand and supply in 
the local labor market, and a consequent rise in wages, to 
the benefit of poorer households. 
Further direct and indirect benefits may also accrue in 
subsequent seasons. At the end of the season, higher maize 
production  should  result from  incremental  fertilizer use 
and increased crop labor inputs, increasing households’ 
incomes. Higher production  should also depress maize 
prices. Higher household maize stocks and lower maize 
prices carried forward into  the  following season should 
again benefit poorer households, reducing their seasonal 
cash flow constraints and their need to hire out their labor, 
so that they can again work more on their own farms. This 
will again tighten the labor market. Higher incomes from 
higher wages should stimulate demand for nonfarm goods 
and services, with spin-off benefits and multipliers in the 
local economy. 
There is considerable empirical support from Asia and 
from Africa for the importance of some of these processes 
and of indirect effects of agricultural growth on wider eco- 
nomic growth. Hazell and Rosegrant (2000) show that the 
indirect effects of increased agricultural production  in the 
green revolution in Asia were the major process driving pro- 
poor growth in the second half of the 20th century. There is 
also a large body of literature on agricultural growth “mul- 
tipliers” in Africa, with estimates that vary from around 1.5 
to over 2.0 (a multiplier of 1.5 indicates that $1.00 of extra 
income from agricultural production results in further 
income growth of $0.50) (Hazell and Hojjati 1995; Reardon 
1998; Delgado, Hopkins, and Kelly 1998). Studies of countries 
across Africa and Asia also generally show that consumption 
 310 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17.10 Estimated Economic Impacts of Subsidy Programs in Malawi 
 
Economic impact 2005/06   2006/07   2007/08   2008/09  
Domestic maize prices ($/mt) May–Oct Nov 2006– May–Oct  Nov 2007– May–Oct  Nov 2008– May–Oct  Nov 2009– 
 2006 Apr 2007 2007  Apr 2008 2008  Apr 2009 2009  Apr 2010 
 139.5 142.7 119.3  243.8 336.6  434.6 271.4  307.1 
Maize price in benefit-cost and 
fiscal efficiency analysis ($/mt) 
 
143 
   
154 
   
250 
   
280 
 
Fertilizer price in analysis ($/mt) 393   490   590   1,250  
Benefit-cost ratio, high response 1.38  1.30  1.90   1.08 
Benefit-cost ratio, moderate 
response 
 
1.12 
  
1.06 
  
1.54 
   
0.90 
Benefit-cost ratio, low response 0.86  0.81  1.18   0.72 
Fiscal efficiency, high response 0.76  0.44  1.13   0.09 
Fiscal efficiency, moderate  response 0.24  0.09  0.68   negative 
Fiscal efficiency, low response negative  negative  0.23   negative 
 2005  2006  2007   2008 
Poverty incidence 50%  45%  40%   40% 
Meals per day 2.0  2.2  2.3   2.3 
Sources: SOAS et al. 2008; Dorward, Chirwa, and Slater 2010b; Food and Nutrition Security Program 2008; NSO 2006, 2009. 
Note: The benefit-cost ratio and fiscal efficiencies were calculated with high, medium, and low fertilizer responses of 18, 15, and 12 kilograms of grain per kilogram of fertilizer, respectively. The 
benefit-cost ratio is calculated as the gross incremental benefits divided by the gross incremental cost, valued at social prices. Fiscal efficiency is calculated as the net economic benefit divided 
by fiscal cost. 
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Figure 17.6 Tracing Direct and Indirect  Subsidy Impacts 
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Source: SOAS et al 2008. 
Note: Solid lines indicate positive impacts for poorer, food-deficit producers and sellers of labor; dashed lines indicate negative impacts for the less poor, 
maize surplus producers, and buyers of labor. 
 
 
 
linkages are more important  than production  linkages, 
accounting for between 50 percent (in Senegal) and 98 per- 
cent (in Zambia) of overall multipliers calculated (Delgado, 
Hopkins, and Kelly 1998). These studies do not, however, 
explicitly consider the further  effects of transfers and 
growth on  seasonal capital constraints, or  the  knock-on 
effects of relaxing these constraints. 
The extent of these effects and  of direct and  indirect 
increases in wages and benefits to poorer households as a 
result of implementation of the subsidy program is, however, 
an empirical question, as is the extent to which productivity 
and welfare benefits are carried forward from one year to 
the next. Focus group discussions in 2007, reporting on the 
effects of the 2005/06 subsidy, clearly (and independently) 
articulated processes of easing of seasonal cash constraints 
in the hungry gap and tightening of labor markets, with 
higher wages and low maize prices throughout  the season 
(SOAS et al. 2008). Similar focus group discussions con- 
ducted in 2009 reported income benefits from higher wages 
and increased maize availability, though they were also con- 
cerned about the adverse effects of high maize prices—and 
the high maize prices experienced after 2006/07 would be 
expected to undermine these processes. 
Livelihood and rural  economy models have also been 
used to investigate and describe this process in 2006/07 (see 
SOAS et al. 2008) and for 2008/09 (Dorward 2010). These 
studies provide results consistent with those of the focus 
group discussion reports, finding that the subsidy con- 
tributes  to  higher  wages but  had  lower wage effects in 
2008/09 and that subsidy benefits have become more con- 
centrated among beneficiaries (because the value of direct 
production  benefits to subsidy recipients is increased with 
higher maize prices, but the benefits of lower maize prices 
and higher wages to poor  nonbeneficiaries are absent or 
reduced). Fragmented information on wage rates over the 
period 2005/06 to 2008/09 suggests that wage rate increases 
over the period were higher than maize price increases over 
the same period, representing real increase in wage rates. 
Further  empirical work is required  to  investigate the 
scale of the indirect benefits through wage effects, because 
they depend heavily upon the scale of growth multipliers 
(consumption multipliers of slightly more than 1.5 embed- 
ded  in  the  livelihood  and  rural  economy  models  are 
derived from historical expenditure patterns in Malawi, 
which are augmented by savings multipliers in the model). 
Without  these multipliers, wage impacts would be very 
low—analysis of 2006/07 and 2008/09 household  survey 
data suggests that agricultural wage labor constitutes less 
than 20 percent of household income even among the 
poorest 20 percent of rural households in Malawi, although 
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observed rises in agricultural wages suggest that unskilled, 
nonagricultural wages have also risen, unless these two labor 
markets are completely separated, an unlikely scenario. 
The overall increase in real wages over the period is sup- 
ported by anecdotal reports of rising rural wages and is con- 
sistent with the limited political and social impact of and 
response to high nominal maize prices in early 2009. It is 
also consistent with reports  of falling poverty rates and 
decreased wasting among children under the age of five. The 
subsidy program is not the only contributor  to these 
improvements. Over the same period, there were good rains, 
a marked improvement  in macroeconomic management, 
and relatively high tobacco prices. These factors will have 
made direct contributions to economic growth, and also 
facilitated the implementation  and impact of the subsidy 
program (the tobacco prices and macroeconomic manage- 
ment contribute to the availability of foreign exchange for 
fertilizer imports, reduce the crowding-out  effects of the 
program, and stimulate other complementary parts of the 
economy; good rains promote good yield responses to 
fertilizers). 
While attribution of these changes to the program is dif- 
ficult, there are reasons to believe that the stimulus to maize 
production from the subsidy and the good rains has been a 
critical element in rural economic growth and poverty 
reduction, as compared with the effects of good tobacco 
prices alone. Limited evidence from elsewhere in Africa and 
the world suggests that even labor-demanding smallholder 
cash crops can drive pro-poor growth in such a broad way. 
Further empirical work is also needed to establish the extent 
to which productivity and welfare gains in one year are car- 
ried  forward  to  subsequent  years, the  conditions  under 
which these gains can be maximized, and the implications 
for subsidy program design and implementation and ques- 
tions about graduation. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND  LESSONS 
 
This chapter suggests that the Malawi agricultural input sub- 
sidy program has achieved substantial benefits and successes, 
although these are more nuanced than some press reports on 
the program suggest. The measured producer benefits of the 
program  relative to its costs have been relatively modest; 
however, our benefit-cost analysis does not capture all the 
benefits of the program, nor all of its costs. Moreover, there 
is scope for considerable improvement in the program’s 
effectiveness and efficiency, although there are also practical 
and  political difficulties regarding the implementation  of 
some of these and questions about their effects. 
Other African countries considering the introduction  of 
agricultural input subsidies can learn important  lessons 
from Malawi’s  experience. The program  is a bold, large- 
scale initiative that  has achieved substantial increases in 
maize production. The implementation of such a program 
represents a very considerable logistical achievement, and 
the government is to be commended for this and for its con- 
tinuing and often imaginative attempts to improve the 
program. Nevertheless, higher maize prices and calculation 
of the agronomic yield effects of incremental fertilizer and 
seed suggest the production  increases resulting from the 
program are not as large as might appear from the post- 
2005/06 national maize production  increases reported  by 
MoAFS. The  benefits  of  the  program  also  have  to  be 
weighed against its very considerable costs (with an average 
of over 9 percent of the national budget going to the subsidy 
program since 2005/06) and the loss of benefits from alter- 
native investment of these funds. While the food security 
and growth benefits of the program have been partially 
undermined by high maize prices, there have still been sig- 
nificant improvements  in  productivity  and  welfare from 
2005/06 associated with greater maize availability and with 
increases in real wages. 
Ongoing  implementation  challenges that  the  govern- 
ment  is working on  include controlling costs, timing  of 
input  deliveries, effective targeting  of  subsidized inputs, 
reducing diversion and fraud, improving agronomic and 
market returns with complementary investments (for 
example, in extension, research, organic soil fertility 
improvement, and roads), and using the subsidy program to 
extend  private  sector  input  delivery systems. Success in 
addressing these challenges will lead to new challenges 
because increasing success will lead to changes in the need 
for such a large-scale program with these objectives—and 
continuing political, strategic, economic, technical, and 
logistical system innovations will be needed to respond to 
these changes. 
Malawi’s experience with its large-scale agricultural 
input subsidy program offers a number  of important  les- 
sons to other countries in Africa considering the introduc- 
tion of agricultural input subsidies. 
First, any growth and development strategy that involves 
agricultural input subsidies must be rooted in the opportu- 
nities for and constraints to growth and development facing 
a country and particular groups within it. This chapter has 
set out  in some detail specific difficulties that  constrain 
broad-based growth in Malawi, highlighting the reliance on 
low-productivity maize and the difficulties and limited 
options faced by very large numbers of poor, food-deficit 
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farmers, and indeed by the Malawian economy as a whole, 
in breaking out of the low-maize-productivity and poverty 
traps. 
This low-productivity trap arises as a result of severe sea- 
sonal credit constraints affecting very large numbers of 
poor, food-deficit farming families, together with thin and 
high-risk, high-margin input and maize markets. Malawi’s 
key achievements with its subsidy program have been the 
ability to raise land and labor productivity and improve 
food security for large numbers of poor households by 
relieving both profitability and affordability constraints on 
the use of inputs needed to increase staple crop productiv- 
ity, leading to some combination  of increased real wages 
and reduced food prices. The Malawian model thus applies 
to other countries only if there are large numbers of people 
facing similar staple-food-productivity  constraints  along- 
side increased input use constrained by thin input markets, 
poorly developed input  supply systems, and  widespread 
profitability and affordability problems. 
Malawi’s experience also shows that, in the right context, 
large-scale agricultural input  subsidy programs  have the 
potential to yield substantial benefits to people and their 
governments with good design and implementation.  The 
chapter has also shown the very substantial costs and 
resources required for such programs, and the difficulties 
and challenges that must be overcome for effective, efficient, 
and sustainable delivery of program benefits. Several issues 
from Malawi’s  experience are relevant to other  countries 
considering similar subsidy programs: 
 
    Focus: subsidies  should be provided for inputs whose use 
for important staple crops is constrained by affordability 
difficulties despite high potential responses to input use. 
    Consumer gains: strong emphasis should be put on wider 
contributions  to economic growth and poverty reduc- 
tion through consumer as well as producer gains. 
    Scale: the subsidy should affect staple crop prices, labor 
markets, or both, requiring sufficient local or national 
scale to affect markets, but strict limits on scale and the 
control of costs are needed to limit displacement of exist- 
ing purchases, crowding out of critical complementary 
investments, and adverse macroeconomic impacts. 
   Logistical systems  face major challenges in delivering 
timely, targeted subsidies to large numbers of widely dis- 
persed farmers, and the establishment of such logistical 
systems requires time and major investments. 
    Performance monitoring, information, and auditing systems 
are needed to develop trust, control fraud, and promote 
efficiency and effectiveness. Debates on crop production 
estimates and the number  of farm families in Malawi 
also demonstrate the importance of reliable information 
for issues beyond specific matters related to the imple- 
mentation of the subsidy program and assessments of its 
impacts. 
    Effective targeting and rationing systems are needed to 
limit scale and increase subsidy impacts on productivity, 
but different (geographical or household) approaches 
face different costs and difficulties (Dorward 2009), and 
in some situations strict rationing of universal provision 
may be a practicable alternative. 
  Entitlement systems are needed for targeting and 
rationing, and these need to be robust against inevitable 
counterfeiting and diversion. 
    Input supply system development requires close attention 
to the complementary and changing roles and interests 
of different public sector and commercial stakeholders, 
but improved farmer access to input services should be a 
major objective and outcome of agricultural input sub- 
sidy programs. 
    Complementary policies and investments: if a subsidy pro- 
gram is seen as part of a broad, long-term strategy for 
poverty reduction and economic development, then 
investments in complementary activities must be made 
in areas such as extension, research, organic soil fertility 
improvement, health, education, markets, transport and 
communication infrastructure, and services. Considera- 
tion of the different roles of these complementary invest- 
ments should also guide decisions on the nature, scale, 
and implementation of the input subsidy, as well as of 
other investments, in order to achieve positive interac- 
tions among investments. 
  Macroeconomic management to promote  favorable 
growth conditions and provide budgetary resources 
needed for such a program is also important. 
    Political commitment is required for sustained mobiliza- 
tion of program resources, but there may also be poten- 
tial conflicts between the need for political support on 
the one hand and targeting, rationing, cost control, and 
performance monitoring  needed for efficient and sus- 
tainable implementation on the other. 
   Sustainability of program  implementation  should be 
addressed by attention to cost control, scale, and logistical 
and performance monitoring and audit systems. There 
is also need for investigation of sustainability of impacts, 
with examination of the extent to which productivity and 
welfare gains carry forward from one year to the next and 
the implications of this analysis for program  design 
and implementation and for questions about graduation. 
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An innate dilemma in the design and implementation of 
large-scale subsidy programs is that such programs require 
both  stability and  flexibility, with innovation.  Stability is 
needed to provide stakeholders with confidence and security 
that will justify long-term financial and other investments 
associated with the program’s implementation. Stability can 
be undermined, however, by the need for flexibility to adjust 
to changing conditions (for example in the weather, in 
international  and national markets and economies, or in 
politics), and some of these changes may be anticipated or 
unanticipated results of the program. Alongside flexibility is 
the need for innovation (in technology, systems, and prices) 
to take advantage of learning and change during program 
implementation.  Although flexibility and  innovation  can 
undermine stability, lack of flexibility and innovation may 
also undermine  stability if conditions, such as increasing 
incidence of fraud, make the system unsustainable and inef- 
fective in its initial form. To achieve mutually supportive 
stability, flexibility, and innovation, trust and stable princi- 
ples must govern both the long-term objectives of and rela- 
tions between different stakeholders on one hand and the 
processes for successful learning, flexibility, and innovation 
on the other. 
 
NOTES 
 
1. This section draws heavily on material from SOAS 
(2008). 
2. Reasons for the high dependency on maize as opposed 
to other food crops include dietary preferences, different 
crops’ relative calorific yields per hectare in different agro- 
ecologies, farmers’  familiarity with the  crop, and  long- 
standing strong government policies aimed at promoting 
maize production and input and crop marketing subsidies 
focused on maize. 
3. Understanding of the nature, causes, and relative impor- 
tance of these problems  varies (indeed,  elements of the 
analysis presented here are not universally accepted, nor is 
this paper a comprehensive account of the complex issues 
involved). 
4. The postharvest value-to-cost ratio has generally been 
less than 2, widely considered to be the minimum required 
to make fertilizer use profitable in moderately but not 
highly risky situations (Morris et al. 2007). Even for higher 
preharvest maize prices, the ratio typically has been around 
or below 2 (SOAS 2008), depending on the yield response 
achieved. With high yield responses, the value-to-cost ratio 
has been above 2 in some years (Maize Productivity Task 
Force 1997). 
5. Table 17.1 shows, for  example, that  the  median  for 
maize stocks running out each year is between four and six 
months after harvest, and that in 2003/04 one bag of fertil- 
izer represented approximately 10 percent of rural house- 
holds’  median  per capita annual  expenditure  (and  more 
than 20 percent of median per capita expenditure of the 
lowest expenditure quintile). 
6. A ratio of 15 was used in the calculations cited above 
based on  what are believed to  represent mean grain-to- 
nitrogen response rates to fertilizer application on farmers’ 
fields. Improved management  and uptake of hybrid seed 
provide the potential for higher ratios (in the range of 22 to 
28 kilograms of maize per kilogram of fertilizer applied). 
Hence, improved farm management practices have the 
potential to make fertilizer use on maize profitable even 
without subsidy, although the affordability constraint 
remains. 
7. This section draws heavily on Dorward (2009). 
8. This analysis applies only to subsidies implemented on a 
scale large enough to affect output prices. Small-scale subsi- 
dies that do not significantly affect product prices are equiv- 
alent to highly elastic product demand: subsidy benefits are 
largely captured  by suppliers  and  producers,  and  dead- 
weight costs depend upon the elasticity of supply. 
9. This is not a problem in situations in which the 
providers of land and labor are poor. Indeed, subsidies can 
promote pro-poor growth in such situations. 
10. For this, complementary constraints to effective use of 
inputs by targeted beneficiaries must be addressed. 
11. The  terms  “coupon”  and  “voucher” are  used  inter- 
changeably in wider discussions of the Malawi Agricultural 
Input Subsidy program and in this paper. 
12. Efficient and  stable output  markets may require  less 
government intervention in direct market operations but 
more focused investment in market insurance and in facili- 
tating infrastructure and institutions. 
13. This section draws heavily on  SOAS (2008) and  on 
Dorward and Chirwa 2009a. 
14. No information is available on seed sales. 
15. A standard maize subsidy pack in 2005/06 consisted of 
one  voucher  for  a 50 kilogram bag of  23:21:0+4S, one 
voucher  for  a 50 kilogram bag of  23:21:0+4S, and  one 
voucher for improved maize seed. A standard tobacco sub- 
sidy pack consisted of one voucher each for a 50 kilogram 
bag of calcium ammonium  nitrate (CAN) and a 50 kilo- 
gram bag of D Compound.  The fertilizer vouchers were 
redeemable for MK 950. The seed voucher required no top- 
up and could be used to purchase 2 kilograms of hybrid 
seed or 3 to 4 kilograms of OPV seed, depending on the 
price set by the seed supply company. 
16. These variations in targeting stem from vagueness in the 
definition of target beneficiaries in the guidelines and dif- 
ferences in the way communities  dealt with problems of 
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shortages. Variations meant that those that were targeting 
beneficiaries placed different emphasis on different criteria 
and processes. 
17. Displacement for 2007/08 is assumed to be similar to that 
for 2006/07 (higher subsidy sales may increase displacement, 
but greater farmer familiarity and higher fertilizer prices 
would be expected to reduce displacement). A lower displace- 
ment is assumed for 2008/09 as a result of much higher fer- 
tilizer prices and earlier (separate) beneficiary registration. 
18. Low average prices in some years in the early 1990s were 
brought about by large-scale imports, and at the turn of the 
century by the starter pack subsidy program  (with good 
weather). 
19. Although the annual average price in 2008/09 was very 
high, peak prices were equivalent to those in 2001/02 and 
2005/06 because prices rose much earlier in the season in 
2008/09 but then flattened out. 
20. The latter may be higher if there are significant exports 
or commercial carryover stocks at the end of the season. 
21. These include inherent and difficult-to-quantify biases 
in different methods of collecting yield data, multicollinear- 
ity between input use and other management variables, high 
variability in smallholder agriculture, and variation of 
response rates with average rates of subsidized fertilizer use. 
22. This  calculation  considers  only  maize  production. 
Provision of the fertilizer subsidy for tobacco leads to a 
much higher displacement than for maize; thus, assuming 
that all incremental fertilizer is used on maize is not 
unreasonable. Fertilizer impacts on crops mixed with 
maize are ignored here. 
23. It is important to note that increased hybrid seed subsi- 
dies may not be required if farmers are able and willing to 
purchase unsubsidized seed—improved access to seed, 
increased distributors, and effective extension may be more 
effective in increasing hybrid seed use. 
24. For 2007/08, however, low crop output  resulting from 
local droughts and floods affected total production, not just 
incremental production from the subsidy. 
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